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Motivated monitoring: the importance of  the 
institutional investment horizon 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates whether institutional investors that hold shares in a firm for a relatively 
long time affect firm performance. We measure performance by Return on Assets (ROA), 
Tobin’s Q and Earnings Yield and find that long-term ownership has a positive, long-lasting 
effect on firm performance. We minimize concerns about endogeneity by incorporating random 
shocks from changes in the constituents of the Russell Index.  We further find that the incentive 
for monitoring firm performance associated with long-term holding is more important than 
some conventional classifications of investors in improving firm value. Even for investors 
usually classified as short term, firm performance will be enhanced for those firms in which they 
hold stocks over longer periods. We also find that a positive link between institutional owners 
and firm performance does not exist when investors only hold the stock for a short term. 
Overall, our paper supports the argument that institutional investors’ monitoring enhances firm 
value. 
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1. Introduction 
The influence of institutional investors on the firm has been studied extensively and investor 
heterogeneity has been shown to be associated with a range of governance outcomes. Investor 
characteristics such as turnover, portfolio concentration, fiduciary duty, investment style and 
business links with firms are emphasized in the literature because these are believed to indicate 
different incentives among investors to monitor firms (Gaspar et al. 2005; Neubaum and Zahra 
2006; Chen et al. 2007; Yan and Zhang 2009; Elyasiani and Jia 2010; Attig et al. 2012;  Aghion et 
al. 2013; Cella et al. 2013). Overall, investors who are long-term orientated and more 
independent are typically believed to be more effective monitors and to play a more positive role 
in firm governance and value.  
However, although it could be agreed that different institutional investors might behave 
differently, little has been discovered on whether each institution would play a similar role in its 
different holding firm. An institution’s role in corporate governance could be largely different 
among its holding firms, for two reasons. First of all, institutional investors are complex entities 
providing different investment products.  A large institutional investor, such as Black Rock, with 
$5.1 trillion assets under management,2 could manage more than 20 different funds following 
different investment styles and trading strategies.  The assumption that it will maintain equal 
monitoring across all its holdings is simplistic and has been rejected by recent empirical evidence 
(Armitage et al.  2017). Secondly, monitoring resources are limited (Sims 2003; Kacperczyk et al. 
2016). On average, institutional investors hold more than 200 stocks in their portfolio (Ward et 
al. 2018).  Therefore, they are unlikely to devote an equal amount of time monitoring every firm 
in which they hold stock.  As noted by Fich et al. (2015) and Ward et al. (2018), institutions’ 
monitoring incentives and resource allocation vary substantially across their portfolio. Consistent 
                                                          
2The data is estimated at December 31 2016 and disclosed at  https://www.blackrock.com/au/individual/about-
blackrock. 
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with this view, an emerging literature is looking at institutional investors’ monitoring and 
resource allocation. 
This paper examines a specific dimension of institutional characteristics: the investment horizon. 
Investment horizons matter because shareholder activism and monitoring activities are costly 
and challenging to implement and require a sufficiently long period to realize benefits (Chen et al. 
2007). Investment horizons will reflect the investors’ choice between short-term transactions and 
longer-term commitments to the firm being held, hence long-term institutional ownership may 
be an important factor in determining firm policies and operational efficiency by the firms in 
which institutions have invested. 
The majority of previous studies have looked at investment horizons on an investor level. They 
classify investors as long- or short-term investors based on the firm’s turnover. (Yan and Zhang 
2009; Cella et al. 2013; Chichernea et al. 2015). This approach assumes that investors would 
consistently be a long- or short-term investors in all their holding companies and overlooks the 
holding horizon difference caused by business complexity and resource limitation.  To account 
for this difference, compared with the traditional literature  we classify investment horizons with 
respect to each stock held within the institutional investors’ portfolios.  When an institutional 
investor holds stocks in a specific firm for more than three years, it is considered as a long-term 
investor for this specific firm. We find that institutional investors’ holding horizons may vary 
more substantially than previously assumed. On average, we find that shor-term investors (using 
the turnover based definition) typically hold more than a quarter of the stocks in their portfolios 
for more than three years. As a corollary, within the portfolios of investors traditionally classified 
as being long term, less than 50% of the stocks in firms are held for more than three years. 
These statistics show that although institutions may be classified as long- or short-term investors, 
they can hold portfolios of stocks that do not uniformly fit into these categorizations. Taking 
these within-portfolio variations into account, we re-examine the question: does a higher 
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monitoring incentive, measured by the length of institutions’ holdings in a firm, enhance firm 
value? The simple answer is “yes”. We find that an increase in the long-term holdings of 
institutional investors is associated with higher subsequent return on assets, Tobin’s ratio and 
earnings yield. This is a persistent effect which lasts for at least five years and is consistent for all 
three performance measures used.  
A potential interpretation of our results is that since our measure of incentive variation is 
positively correlated with the range of different institutional investors, our result may simply 
reflect the different types of investors. For example, the effect on firm performance that we 
ascribe to an increase in long-term holdings by all investors could more simply be ascribed to an 
increase in the type of investor previously classified as being long term. In other words, we need 
to distinguish between the effect of investor type and the behavior of investors in general. To 
clarify this issue, we look at the long-term holdings of each type of investor, under three 
different classification schemes. We find that higher long-term holding of all types of investor is 
consistently associated with superior firm performance in the future. Even for transient investors 
whose investment horizon overall is short (Chen et al.  2007) and “grey investors”, such as banks 
and insurance companies, whose monitoring capability might be compromised by their business 
links with the firm (Ferreira and Matos 2008; Chung et al. 2012; Luong et al. 2016), their long-
term holdings are still found to be value enhancing. These consistent findings indicate that the 
monitoring effect that stems from variation within investors’ portfolios is clearly distinct from 
changes in the types of institution. 
To address any concerns of endogeneity about whether firms will hold firms with better 
performance for longer periods, following the recent literature we use an instrumental variable 
approach by exploiting  exogenous shocks on the long-term ownership generated by changes in 
the composition of the Russell indices ( Fich et al. 2015; Appel et al. 2016; Schmidt and 
Fahlenbrach 2016).   When firms are included or excluded from the Russell 1000 and Russell 
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2000 index due to relative market capitalization changes, the change in the weight of a firm in the 
index will drive index tracker funds to rebalance their portfolio and lead to associated trading by 
other institutions.  Therefore, after controlling for market capitalization, the shock provides a 
clear method of identifying the effect of long-term holdings on firm performance free from 
endogeneity concerns (Fich et al. 2015).  All our estimates are valid under this 2SLS framework. 
Moreover, to avoid the concern that our results may be subject to the idiosyncratic choice of 
variable, we use alternative measures to test the robustness of the approach; our results and 
conclusions remain valid.  
A related issue is whether the short-term holdings of institutional investors have the same effect 
on firm performance.  Studies such as Aghion et al. (2013) and Giannetti and Yu (2018), find 
that short-term holdings can also lead to better firm operations because they can readily exercise 
their power by selling their holdings, whereas other studies conclude that short-term investors’ 
holdings can have a negative effect on subsequent performance (Gaspar et al. 2005; Chichernea 
et al. 2015). Thus, the story as to whether short-term holdings influence future performance is 
somewhat ambiguous.  By applying the same analytical framework, the short-term holdings of 
institutional investors are defined as shares with less than one year overall holding length. We 
find that firm performance is reduced following an increase in institutional investors’ short -term 
holding.  These findings imply that even if institutions have the capability to undertake firm 
monitoring, the lack of incentive arising from their short-term perspective will fail to increase 
performance.  
In summary, in line with previous studies such as  Gaspar et al.  (2005) and Chichernea et al. 
(2015), we conclude that the institutional monitoring incentive, as measured by its holding 
horizon, tends to be positively related to firm performance. These findings support the argument 
that investor monitoring creates value. This assessment also accords with recent evidence, such 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
7 
 
as Fich et al. (2015), that investors will distribute their attention allocation unevenly and tilt the 
monitoring resource to a subset of firms  held in their portfolios. 
Our findings contribute to two strands of the literature. First, they provide new evidence that 
institutional shareholders will increase firm value. There is an ongoing debate on the overall 
effect of institutional monitoring of the firm. Some studies argue that strong shareholders willing 
to intervene would lead to worse operational outcome because the active institutional investor 
might exploit the private benefits of control or might increase managerial myopia (La Porta et al. 
1999; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 2009; Cai et al.  2016).  Other studies hold the opposing view 
and emphasize the benefits of institutional monitoring and engagement with a consequent 
reduction in agency costs (Chen et al. 2007; Fich et al. 2015). Our study provides evidence that 
the benefit of shareholder monitoring clearly outweighs the cost of monopolistic shareholder 
power.  
In addition, this study also relates to the literature which discusses the effect of heterogeneity 
between institutions based on firm outcomes (Appel et al. 2016; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2016). 
We conclude that the incentive variation within an institutional portfolio has an independent and 
stronger effect on firm performance than changes in the distribution of different types of 
institutional investor, in accordance to the argument of Fich et al. (2015) .   
The rest of the paper is organized as following: Section 2 will be a literature review and 
hypothesis development. This is followed by a description of our data source and variable 
construction (Section 3). The main empirical test will be discussed in Section 4 and this is 
followed by reports on the endogeneity and robustness tests (Sections 5 and 6) before the 
conclusion in Section 7. 
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2. Key hypothesis and related litereture 
Previous studies argue that institutional investors may exert influence on a firm through two 
mechanisms. The first is the ‘voice’ that represents the direct intervention of the investor in 
corporate activities. For example, McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) surveyed institutional 
investors and investigated how they engage with firms. They found that the most frequently used 
intervention methods, in decreasing order of frequency, are: (1) voting against management at 
the annual general meeting, (2) initiating discussion with the executive board, (3) contacting the 
supervisory board, (4) disclosing their voting against management, and (5) publicly criticising 
executive board members. Their study provides direct evidence of institutional investors’ 
intervention in corporate governance. There are also many studies documenting the effects of 
institutional intervention on the firm. These studies frequently use shareholder activism to 
represent the intervention of shareholders through the voice channel. For example, Bradley et al. 
(2010) found that institutional investors could force the closed-end funds to be open-ended, 
thereby creating value by eliminating the closed-end fund discount. Brav et al. (2008) applied an 
event-study framework and found that shareholder activism leads to an average 7% abnormal 
return around the announcement date. They also found evidence that such events lead to 
improvements in the pay-out ratio, return on assets, and operating margins. Brav, Jiang, & Kim 
(2015) used plant-level data and found that shareholder intervention leads to improved 
productivity, especially in business strategy-orientated interventions.  
Recent studies have begun to investigate the second mechanism through which institutional 
investors may monitor firm operations and reduce agency problems – trading firms’ shares. This 
effect is frequently referred to as the ‘exit’ channel. If a manager does not behave in a manner 
that improves shareholder value, investors may sell their shareholdings. This selling would lead 
to a decrease in the share price and punish the irresponsible behaviour of management ex post. 
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The possibility that shareholders may walk away also creates an ex-ante threat that compels 
managers to act in a way that would fulfill their fiduciary duty (Edmans 2014).  
The cost and benefit of institutional monitoring through both “voice” and “exit” channel are 
closely related to the investment horizon.  Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) argue that longer 
holding horizon could enable institutional investors to acquire a better knowledge of the firm, 
thereby reducing the cost of monitoring. On the other hand, by holding shares for a long time, 
institutional investors could exert more influence on the firm through their interaction with the 
management. Therefore, long time holding could result in greater monitoring benefit.  The 
effectiveness of monitoring through “exit” is also associated with the investment horizon. The 
event that an institutional investor sells shares of a firm it held for a long period of time will send 
a much stronger signal to the market than the event that the investor sells a short-term holding 
firm. Therefore, by holding for a longer period, the threat of exit will become more considerable 
to management, and the monitoring will become more effective. Because a longer investment 
horizon will be associated with lower monitoring costs, higher monitoring benefits and more 
effective exit threats. We should expect a positive relationship between long-term holdings of 
institutional investors and the performance of the firm. 
 
3. Data and variable definition 
3.1. Data source 
Our main source for the accounting data and financial ratios is COMPUSTAT. Ownership data 
are provided by the Thomson Financial Ownership Database, which reports all holdings of US 
institutional investors having more than $100 million assets under management. To avoid 
potential problems of mis-identification, recycled and unreliable classifications, we update the 
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13F data by using the information provided by Bushee.3 Data related to stock prices, returns and 
trading volume are downloaded from CRSP. 
 
3.2. Variables definition 
  Firm performance measures 
We use three different measurements as proxies for firm performance. The first is Return on 
Assets (ROA), defined as net income divided by firm asset value. It is a direct measurement of 
how much net income is generated by a firm per unit of assets. Higher ROAs signal more 
efficient earnings generation and therefore better performance. The second measure is Tobin’s Q 
ratio (TBQ), the market value of a firm’s assets divided by the book value. 4 Tobin’s Q reflects the 
market view of how valuable a firm’s current assets are. When a firm has high growth prospects, 
Tobin’s Q will have a higher value.  The third ratio used is the firm’s Earnings Yield or Earnings 
price ratio (EY), which is defined as the prospective earnings per share divided by the current stock 
price. We use Earnings Yield to measure firms’ earning growth, instead of the earnings per share 
growth rate, to avoid the measurement problem of negative earnings.5 When the earnings yield is 
higher, the firm is valued as having good earnings capacity. 
Although in all our regression specifications we controlled for industry fixed effects, the time 
varying industry characteristic could still influence our results. To minimize such concerns, we 
adjust the three performance measures by deducting the industry median value from the 
calculated figure. In non-tabulated results, our findings remain essentially similar if we use 
unadjusted firm performance measures. 
                                                          
3 Bushee’s website, http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. 
4 Calculated by dividing the sum of market value of equity, long-term debt and debt in current liabilities by the book 
value.  
5 When the earnings per share (EPS) of the firm in the previous year is negative, a more negative EPS in the current 
year will lead to a positive EPS growth rate, which is clearly misleading. 
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Another point worth noting is that all our performance variables are measured as future 
performance, and current performance is added as a control. There are two reasons for us to 
apply the model in this way. First, using future performance could partially alleviate the reverse 
causality concern, because future performance is less likely to be the reason for current 
ownership variation. Second, for institutional investors to exert their influence on the firm, there 
will always be a process of information collection. The interaction between shareholders and 
managers will also take time. Therefore, the effect of institutional holding on firm performance 
could be delayed. 
Long-term institutional ownership. 
We classify institutional ownership into long-term and short-term categories based on the actual 
holding horizon of each institution in each firm. In our main specification, all institutional 
ownership lasting for more than three years is classified as long-term ownership. To mitigate the 
classification error which may be induced by long-term investors’ market timing activity, if an 
investor exits the firm but returns within the following year, its holding period is deemed as 
continued since the previous period in which it sold its shares. However, if the investor leaves 
the firm for more than one year, we will reset it’s holding period count to 0 when it returns. We 
then aggregate the ownership of long-term investors at the firm level to create variable of long-
term ownership (L3). 
Our classification method differs from the one frequently used in the literature. Much of the 
existing literature classifies investors as long term or short term based on a measure of how 
quickly they turn over their aggregate portfolio. When portfolio turnover is relatively fast, 
investors are identified as short-term investors. In contrast, when investors have a relatively low 
turnover, they are classified as long-term investors.  The measurement used is normally the 
“churn ratio” (Gaspar and Massa 2005, 2006; Yan and Zhang 2009; Attig et al. 2012, 2013; Cella 
et al.  2013; Chichernea et al. 2015) . 
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The “churn ratio”, or turnover-based investor classification scheme, assumes that investors 
maintain the same attitude, preference and behavior regardless of the firms in which they invest. 
For two reasons, this assumption could be too strong. First of all, in reality institutional investors 
do not have the same incentives and motivations for all the firms in which they invest. (Fich et al. 
2015). The assumption that an investor will treat all the firms held equally is too strong to be 
realistic. The second reason that the aggregate churn ratio may be misleading is that because of 
the limitations of the 13F holding report, portfolio turnover is reported at the company or 
institutional level rather than at the fund level.6 As a result, a single institution may have several 
different constituent investing entities that follow different strategies and styles and this will 
make the churn ratio based classification unreliable. We will provide quantitative estimates of the 
potential mis-classification problem in Section 4.1. 
Our classification of ownership is free of look-ahead bias. Institutional investors are only 
classified as long-term owners after we observe actual investment horizons longer than three 
years. For example, if an investor A holds a firm B from December 2005 to December 2008, its 
holding is classified as long-term holding only in 2008 when we observe its holding is actually 
long term. This definition may under-estimate the actual long-term holding of the firm since 
some investors may intend to take a long-term position but actually sell their holdings in a firm 
after only a short period.  Additionally, to avoid the concern of using ex post information to form 
a current variable, we decide not to impute the holding behavior of long-term investors in their 
first three years of holding stock.  In the tabulated results, we also have alternative long-term 
ownership variables which classify the holdings of the same investor in the first three years also 
as long-term holding (in our example, holdings of B by A from December 2005 to December 
2008).  All our test results remain robust.  
Control variables 
                                                          
6 See the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website: ttps://www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm. 
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We also control for other firm characteristics that could distort the findings. To account for firm 
financing and investment levels, we control for leverage (debt to asset ratio, DTA) and capital 
expenditure ratio (CAPX). To control the fact that firm might be in different stages of their life 
cycle, we control for firm size (natural log of market capitalization, LOGMV) and firm 
age (AGE). Lastly, to control for the liquidity environment that firms might be facing, we 
control for turnover (TOV) in our regressions. Detailed variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix A. We also tried specifications with additional control variables such as book to 
market ratio, stock returns and dividend yield. All our results remained qualitatively similar. 
However, to avoid concerns of potential multicollinearity, we delete these variables in the final 
specifications. 
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4. Empirical results: institutional investment horizon and firm performance 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Who are the long-term investors? Horizon preferences of different types of investors 
Before we get to the main analysis of the regression results, we summarize the investment 
horizon preferences of different investors. We use the three-classification scheme provided by 
Bushee (2001) to categorize different institutional investors. The first classification is based on 
institutional portfolio diversification and turnover. Investors who holds more concentrated 
portfolios with low turnover are classified as dedicated investors and are normally believed to be 
investors most likely to be engaged in corporate governance (Chen et al. 2007). Investors with 
more diversified portfolios and lower turnover are classified as quasi-indexers, and investors who 
have high portfolio turnover and diversified portfolio are classified as transient investors. The 
second classification is based on the investors’ investment styles. Investors who prefer high (low) 
dividend yield, low (high) market to book ratio and low (high) price to earnings ratio are 
classified as value (growth) investors while all other investors are classified as growth-income 
investors on the basis that they do not show clear preferences. (Bushee 2001). The final 
classification scheme is based on institutional investors’ fiduciary duties. The Thomson Financial 
13F database classifies investors into seven categories reflecting their fiduciary responsibilities. 
These categories comprise Public Pension Funds, Banks, Insurance, Corporate (Private) Pension 
Funds, University and Foundation Endowment, Investment Companies and Independent 
Investment Advisors.  
reports the institutional preferences in terms of holding horizons. The Average Holdings column 
shows the percentage of total shares outstanding held by each type of institutional investor. The 
Average Long-Term Holdings column shows the percentage of total shares outstanding held by 
investors for more than three years. The Proportion of Long-Term Holdings column shows the 
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proportion of each type of institutional investor holdings that are classified as long term. It can 
be seen from Table 1 that transient investors, growth investors, independent investment advisors 
and corporate pension funds have the lowest proportions of shares held for more than three 
years (proportion of long-term holdings ranging from about 25% to 40%). In other words, these 
investors tend to have shorter horizons. On the other hand, quasi-indexers and value growth 
investors, banks, investment companies, insurance companies and public pension funds tend to 
have more long-term holdings in their portfolio (the proportion of their long-term holdings 
range from about 45% to 58%). 
[Table 1] 
Although institutional investors of different kinds show variation in their preferences for long-
term holdings, the difference may not be as high as might have been expected. For example, in 
the dedicated–quasi-indexer–transient scheme, dedicated investors, who might have been 
expected to be long-term monitoring investors (Chen et al. 2007), hold less than half of their 
stocks for more than three years while transient investors, who would normally be expected to 
have the least incentive to take long-term positions, still hold more than a quarter of their 
portfolios in the long term.  These findings show that the within-portfolio variation of 
institutional investor are substantial and should not be ignored. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our main analysis. As can be seen, 
long-term ownership in our definition on average accounts for 15% of firms’ shares outstanding 
as well as accounting for about a half of total institutional ownership.  After adjusting for 
industry effects in the dependent variables, the average and median of all three performance 
measures are close to 0. We also note that on average about half of the institutional holdings are 
long term, showing that long-term ownership is important in terms of shareholder control.  
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 4.2. Baseline regression: long-term holdings and firm performance 
The key research question we investigate is whether a higher level of long-term ownership, and 
therefore a greater incentive to monitor, is associated with superior firm performance. We adopt 
the following baseline model: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡+1,𝑡+4 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐿3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where firm performance measures = industry adjusted Returns on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q 
(TBQ) and Earnings Yield (EY).  
All performance measures are quarterly averages from quarter t+1 to quarter t+4.  Long-term 
ownership (L3), is defined as the proportion of institutional investors who hold the firm stocks 
for more than three years. Control variables include leverage (DTA), capital expenditure ratio 
(CAPX), firm size (LOGMV) and firm age (AGE). We also control for the SIC 2-digit industry 
(𝜃𝑖) and quarterly time (𝜇𝑡) fixed effects.  Our standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
[Table 2] 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, long-term ownership is positively and significantly related to all three 
measures of firm performance. These results suggest that long-term holdings by institutional 
investors increase firm values.  These findings are consistent with the literature which argues that 
long-term institutional ownership might improve firm governance and increase firm value (Chen 
et al. 2007), and they support our claim that institutional investors’ monitoring will lead to better 
firm performance. 
[Table 3] 
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4.3. Long-term ownership and long-run performance 
We extend our analysis to longer horizons by looking at the persistence of the influence of long-
term ownership on firm value. To do this, we estimate the regression on different subsequent 
time horizons: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡+4∗𝑁 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐿3𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where the N in the subscript takes values from 1 to 5. For each performance measure, we 
estimate the model by using the performance measure at quarter t+4N for six different time 
periods.  
Over the three performance measures, we have 18 different regressions. Figure 1 shows the 
estimation of 𝛽 and corresponding confidence interval at the 95% level.  
As can be seen in Figure 1, in all 18 regressions, long-term ownership is always positively related 
to firm performance and the coefficients are all significant at the 1% level. Moreover, there is 
even a rising trend in the coefficients’ estimates. These findings clearly show that the value 
enhancing effect of long-term ownership are persistent. 
 
[Figure 1] 
There are two reasons that the long-term holdings of institutional investors could lead to a long-
lasting effect on the improvement of firm performance. First, the long holdings of institutional 
investors tend to stay for a long time.7 We rank firms according to the long-term holdings of 
institutional investors into five quantiles and look at the change in their rank 5 years’ later. Table 
B2 in Appendix B reports the result. For a firm with highest long-term institutional holding rank, 
the chance of still having a high long-term holding rank (4 and 5) after five years is as high as 
77.3% (19.7%+57.6%). This finding shows that long-term holding of institutional investors are 
                                                          
7 We thank the referee for pointing this out. 
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long-lasting.  Second, the cost of institutional monitoring tends to reduce over time while the 
benefit tends to increase over time. When investors hold shares for longer period of time, they 
will have a better existing knowledge of the firm and will be able to process the new information 
faster. Long-term holdings also enable institutional investors to impose influence on the 
management, share more financial gain and obtain an information advantage. (Chen, Harford 
and Li 2007). The long-lasting nature of long-term holding and better cost-benefit trade-off 
jointly lead to a persistent improvement in firm performance.  
5. Endogeneity and 2SLS regressions 
There is a natural concern that our results might arise through an endogeneity problem. In 
contrast to the interpretation that monitoring investors improve firm value, it is also possible 
that investors tend to hold firms which they believe could continue to outperform. In other 
words, the longer holding length could be the result instead of the reason for higher long-term 
ownership, thereby giving rise to a reverse causality interpretation. In addition, there may be 
some factors which influence both the ownership and firm performance for which we failed to 
control. This would lead to the “omitted variable bias”. 
Our main analysis does not ignore such concerns. First, our results show that the positive impact 
of ownership on performance will last for long periods of time. The reverse causality problem 
will be less likely to be a concern when our dependent variables are much later in time than the 
independent variable. Second, the industry, year fixed effects and industry adjustment on the 
dependent variables would be expected to eliminate a large part of any potential omitted variable 
concerns. Nevertheless, we admit that even with these measures, the endogeneity concern 
cannot be fully eliminated. 
We adopt an IV approach which has been widely used in the literature to address the 
endogeneity issue. Our identification strategy follows Fich et al. (2015), Crane et al. (2016) and 
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Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2016)  which exploit ownership changes caused by the annual changes 
in the Russell index. The Russell 1000 and 2000 index are reconstituted in June every year. All 
stocks traded in major US stock markets are ranked by their market capitalization on May 31 
each year. The largest 1000 firms are included in the Russell 1000 index, the next 2000 firms are 
assigned to the Russell 2000 index. Firms that are close to the index threshold are very similar on 
all aspects (Fich et al. 2015; Appel et al. 2016; Schmidt and Fahlenbrach 2016). As pointed out by 
Fich et al. (2015), since the Russell indexes are value weighted, the only factor that leads to an 
index switch is the market capitalization of the firm.  As the index switch events are correlated 
with the market cap, this event is not purely random. Nevertheless,  as long as the market 
capitalization is controlled for in the regression, the index membership change will become 
random and therefore the exclusion condition is satisfied. 
Firms at the bottom of Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 with be allocated a very small weight in the 
index portfolio. In contrast, the stocks at the top of the Russell 2000 will be given a higher 
weight. The difference in weight on both sides of the threshold will lead investors who track the 
Russell 1000 or 2000 index to rebalance their portfolios as a result of the index reconstitution, 
which will lead to variations in the institutional ownership of the firm. The threshold between 
the bottom of the Russell 2000 and smaller stocks below will lead to similar variations.  
 
There are several reasons for long-term institutional holdings to be influenced by the index 
switch. First, passive investors by definition track the index construction, and their holdings are 
thus influenced by the index switch. Existing studies have found evidence that index tracking 
investors are effective monitors of the firm. For these investors, selecting a better stock may not 
be an option. But they can monitor the holding firms to make sure that the firms they have to 
hold perform better. In addition, passive investors are also entitled to vote. Since on average, 
they have lower turnover compared to active investors, managers would incline more to their 
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views (Appel, et al. 2016). Any index switch would have a significant impact on their ownership 
and therefore on the effectiveness of monitoring . 
 
Second, the index switch can also influence active investors. Even if active investors are not 
mimicking the portfolio weight of the index, many of them still need to compare their 
investment performance with certain benchmarks. For two firms with the same expected future 
return, active investors would still prefer the one in index membership because to choose this 
firm could reduce the tracking error of the investment  (Wurgler 2010). On the other hand, a 
firm being added to or deleted from an index are events that attract investor attention. These 
events may increase the chance that firms become targets of active investors, therefore providing 
an incentive for active investors to adjust their portfolio. 
 
Based on the rationale above, we adopt a IV regression framework to overcome the endogeneity 
problem. We use 2SLS approach to estimate the following model: 
𝐿3𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅1𝑇𝑅2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅2𝑇𝑅1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅2𝑇𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝑇𝑅2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐵 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where R1TR2 (R2TR1) are dummy variables taking one in the year following a stock moving 
from one Russell index to another. R2TN is a dummy variable taking one in the year that the 
firm dropped out of the Russell index due to a relative fall in market capitalization. NTR2 is a 
dummy variable taking one in the year the firm is moved from below into the Russell 2000 
index. The control variables, industry and time fixed effects are added in as before. The 
predicted values of long-term ownership 𝐿3̂  are then substituted for L3 in the main regression 
to perform the second stage regression. 
[Table 4] 
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Results for the first stage regression are reported in first three columns of Table 4. We observe 
that three of the index switching dummies have significant impacts on long-term ownership. 
These results are generally in line with Fich et al.  (2015) . Columns (4)–(6) report the results of 
the second stage estimation results. We can see that the initial results of our main analysis stand. 
We still observe that long-term institutional ownership has a positive impact on firms’ 
performance.  
 
6. Robustness tests and further discussion 
6.1. Characteristics vs. incentives 
Numerous studies have found that some characteristics (legal, etc.) of institutional investors 
appear to have an impact in determining the influence of institutions on the firms in which they 
hold stock. To ensure that our findings are not purely driven by investors with specific 
characteristics, we follow the literature (Bushee 1998, 2001; Bushee and Noe 2000; Bushee and 
Goodman 2007) to classify investors into three categories and then look at the long-term holding 
effect of each type of investors on firm performance.   
Investors classified by fiduciary responsibility 
The first classification is based on fiduciary responsibilities. The Thomson Financial 13F 
database classifies investors into seven categories based on their fiduciary responsibilities. These 
categories comprise Public Pension Funds, Banks, Insurance, Corporate (Private) Pension Funds, 
University and Foundation Endowment, Investment Companies and Independent Investment 
Advisors. 8   Investors with different fiduciary responsibility may be associated with different 
                                                          
8 The original categories are provided by Thomson Financial, but the classification is imprecise since 1998, so we use 
Bushee’s correction to update the classification into correct ones. Please see 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html for detail. 
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investment horizons (Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Cox et al. 2004; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). In 
addition, they may have informal links which may lead to firms being differentially affected by 
investor action (Brickley et al. 1988; David et al. 1998; Cornett et al. 2007; Ferreira and Matos 
2008; Elyasiani and Jia 2010).  We follow the literature by aggregating investors into pressure 
insensitive investors (independent investment advisor, investment company and public pension 
fund, denoted as IND) and pressure sensitive investors (bank, insurance and others, denoted as 
GRY) (Chen et al.  2007). 
Investors classified by investment style 
Institutional investors may have different investment styles. Some may prefer growth and be 
more interested in firms with high growth rates, lower dividend yield and higher market to book 
valuation. Other investors may prefer value and be more attracted by firms with higher dividend 
pay-outs and potentially undervalued. We follow Bushee’s classification to divide investors into 
“Value”, “Growth” and “Growth/Income” investors (the third category indicating that the 
investor cannot easily be attributed into either of the previous two types). 
Investors classified by portfolio turnover and holding concentration 
Based on portfolio turnover and concentration, institutions can also be classified as transient 
investors, dedicated investors and quasi-indexers (Bushee and Goodman 2007; Aghion, et al. 
2013).  
To distinguish between monitoring incentive and investor characteristics, we calculate the long-
term holding of each type of investor under the previous three classification schemes. We then 
examine the association between the long-term holdings of each type of investor and subsequent 
firm performance. If the monitoring incentive is a more important factor than investor 
characteristics in its effect on firm performance, we should observe distinguishable effects of 
long-term holdings of different investors on firm performance. In contrast, if the monitoring 
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incentive is more important than investor characteristics, we should observe that the monitor 
incentive will dominate and that all types of investor will have similar impacts on firm value. 
[Table 5] 
Table 5 displays our findings. We regress all three performance measures on the long-term 
holdings of each type of institutional investor. For simplicity, we only report the second stage 
results of our 2SLS regressions.9  As can be observed from Table 5, long-term ownership of all 
types of investors is consistently positively correlated with firm future performances. Even for 
transient investors and grey investors who for one reason or other might be not be expected to 
be actively engaged with the firms in which they invest, an increase in the proportion of long-
term holdings is still found to be value enhancing. These results clearly indicate that the 
institutional monitoring incentive is the most important factor contributing to firms’ overall 
performance. 
6.2. Alternative measures of long-term ownership 
To ensure that our result is not subject to ambiguity concerning the horizon choice and variable 
stability, we test our result using alternative measures of long-term institutional ownership. The 
first alternative measure we use is L5, which defined as the ownership of institutional investors 
who holds shares in the firm for more than five years. This measure will lead to a stricter 
definition of long-term investors, as the monitoring incentive might be expected to be stronger 
when the observed holding period becomes longer. The second measure (LIOP) is the definition 
of long-term ownership used by Yan and Zhang (2009) in which long and short investors are 
classified according to their portfolio turnover. This measure will be noisier because although 
investors with lower portfolio turnover are more likely to have more long-term positions, a large 
proportion of their holdings could, for reasons explained earlier, be short term. 
                                                          
9 The OLS estimation result is essentially similar and therefore not reported to save space. 
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[Table 6] 
The 2SLS estimation results are reported in Table 6 where the conclusions drawn from the 
baseline regression are largely supported by the regressions using alternative measures. When 
measured over longer horizons, long-term ownership is associated with higher ROA, Tobin’s Q 
and EY (columns (4)–(6)). Even if we use the noisier measure LIOP, long-term ownership is still 
positively related to ROA and Tobin’s Q although EY is no longer significant.  
6.3. Effect of short-term investors on firm performance 
Our analysis so far shows that holdings by long-term investors have a positive effect on firm 
value. A related question is; are short-term investors associated with a similar increase in firm 
profitability?  Many studies argue that in general institutional investors have a significant impact 
on the firm (Yan and Zhang, 2009; Aghion et al. 2013). To examine whether more short-term 
institutional investors have a similar beneficial effect as long-term investors we need to apply our 
analysis to short-term institutions. 
We construct three variables to measure ownership by short-term investors. Short-term investors’ 
holding horizons are calculated as the overall holding period from first buying stock in the firm 
to selling. A holding period of less than one year is classified as S1, a two-year or less is classified 
as S2. We also use portfolio turnover, classifying investors whose portfolio turnover are among 
the highest 30% of all investors as SIOP. We then regress firm performance on the ownership of 
these investors and control variables. As with the analysis of long-term investors, we continue to 
apply 2SLS regression. 
The effect of short-term investors on firm performance are reported in Table 7.  It can be seen 
that short-term institutional ownership is associated negatively with subsequent firm 
performance. Higher short-term ownership will lead to lower ROA, lower Tobin’s Q and lower 
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EY.  Moreover, the negative impact appears to become weaker when the horizon used to define 
short-term holders become longer.  
Our findings shows clear evidence that a positive holding performance relationship only exists 
when the holdings are long term and short-term holdings are negatively associated with firm 
performance. There are several possible reasons that why short-term holdings may have a 
negative effect. The first reason is that short-term investors may not have enough monitoring 
incentive. Chen et al. (2007) point out that monitoring is optimal for investors when the benefits 
exceed the costs in in the long term. For short-term holdings, since the costs are higher than the 
benefits, not to monitor might be a better choice. A lack of monitoring incentive could lead to 
higher agency costs and, therefore, lower performance. The second potential reason is that 
investors could predict firm performance. When they only hold stocks for short period of time, 
they may already foresee worse performance in the future.10 The third potential reason is that 
short-term investors may force the firm to adopt short-term oriented policies to maximize short-
term gain while sacrificing long-term growth potential.  Even though we adopted a 2SLS 
approach to mitigate any endogeneity problem, we acknowledge the limitation that we did not 
disentangle the three different hypotheses completely. Since our main purpose is to focus on the 
monitoring effect of long-term investors, we decide to leave the further discussion about short-
term holding for future studies.  
6.4. Persistence of firm performance and institutional holdings 
There is a concern that the positive relation between the long-term holdings of institutional 
investors and firm performance may only simply be mirroring the fact that both long-term 
holdings and firm performance are persistent.11 We have made some efforts to address this 
concern. First, in our main regression, the current performance of firms has been controlled  for, 
therefore the effect of holdings on performance should be independent of the effect of past 
                                                          
10 We thank the referee for pointing this out. 
11 We thank the referee for pointing this out. 
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performance. Second, it is likely that the relation between past performance on future 
performance is not linear. To alleviate this concern, we double sort all the firms into 25 different 
portfolios according to the quintile of current firm performance and current long-term 
institutional holdings. The average performances of firms in the t+1 to t+4 quarter in each 
portfolio are shown in Table 8.  Columns (1)–(5) in each panel shows the future performance of 
the firm with a current performance rank from low to high while rows  (1)–(5) show the future 
performance of firms with long-term institutional ownership ranking from low to high. 
 As we can see in each row of Table 8, firms with better current performance do not necessarily 
outperform in the future. For example, a firm with high current Tobin’s Q may actually have a 
lower Tobin’s Q in the next year. However, in each column, we can see that no matter the rank 
of current firm performance, firms with a higher long-term institutional holding ranking 
consistently outperform firms with a low long-term holding ranking. These findings provide 
additional evidence that performance persistence is not the main driver of our results. 
7. Conclusion 
The beneficial effects on firm performance resulting from the monitoring of their management 
by institutional investors has long been recognized. In this paper, we have endeavored to drill 
down to a finer analysis of the type of institutional behaviour most closely responsible for any 
improvement in managerial decision making, by identifying the holding period of institutions of 
their actual holding behavior in each firm in which they hold stock. We define long-term 
investors on the basis that they have already held stock in each firm for a specified period and 
argue that the longer the investor holds stock in a company, the greater the incentive for the 
investor to actively engage in monitoring the performance of the firm management. We find that 
an increase in the proportion of long-term investors does indeed lead to better performance as 
measured by ROA, Tobin’s Q and EY. We conduct additional tests to guard against any mis-
interpretation of the results on the basis of endogeneity and we examine the robustness of our 
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results by trying different definitions of long term, including the classification of the fiduciary 
basis, the links between the investors and the firms in which they invest. Our conclusions remain 
consistent across the range of additional tests and techniques used. Finally, we look at short-term 
institutional investors and find, using similar techniques and tests, that they are not associated 
with better performance but more typically worse.   This is consistent with our prior belief that 
short-term investors would have less incentive than long-term investors to actively engage with 
the management of the firms in which they hold stock and reinforces the belief that a strong 
basis of long-term institutional investor ownership contributes to an improvement in firm 
management and performance. 
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9. Tables and figures 
Table 1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows which type of investors tend to be long-term investors. The sample period is 1982–2013. All firms 
have completed information in CRSP and the COMPUSTAT database. Institutional ownership data is from the 
Thomson Financial Institutional Holding database. Average Holdings are the average percentage holdings of each 
type of investor in each company. Average Long-Term Holdings are the average percentage holdings of each type 
of investor in each company which exceeds three years. Proportion of Long-Term Holdings are the ratio of long-
term holding of each type of investor to the average holding of this type of investor. Classifications are provided 
by Bushee (1998).  
 
Average Holdings 
Average Long-Term  
Holdings 
Proportion of 
Long- term 
Holdings 
Investors classified by portfolio diversification and turnover:  
Dedicated Investors 4.61% 2.16% 46.92% 
Quasi-Indexer 17.53% 9.53% 54.37% 
Transient Investors 7.63% 1.93% 25.33% 
    
Investors classified by style: 
 Value Style 9.77% 4.47% 45.73% 
Growth & Income  13.37% 6.70% 50.08% 
Growth Style 6.95% 2.41% 34.68% 
    
Investors classified by fiduciary duties: 
 Indep. Investment Advisors 17.36% 6.63% 38.18% 
Banks 5.17% 3.02% 58.46% 
Investment Companies 4.03% 2.16% 53.59% 
Insurance Companies 1.79% 0.93% 51.69% 
Public Pension Funds 0.86% 0.46% 53.19% 
Miscellaneous  0.75% 0.28% 37.73% 
Corporate Pension Funds 0.31% 0.11% 34.17% 
University and Fundaments 0.12% 0.05% 39.12% 
    
All institutional investors: 32.87% 15.22% 46.30% 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of variables used in the regression analysis. The sample 
period is from 1982–2013.All firms have completed information in CRSP and the 
COMPUSTAT database. The institutional ownership data is from the Thomson Financial 
Institutional Holding database. The number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and maximum are displayed from left to right. 
Detailed definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix A. All the missing data in the 
ownership, control variables and instrumental variables are filled with 0. ROAi,t+1,t+4,,TBQi,t+1,t+4 
and EYi,t,,t+4, are averages from quarter t+1 to quarter t+4. All other variables are measured at 
quarter t. 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 25% 50% 75% Max 
Firm performance:        
ROA 570639 -0.01 0.05 -0.25 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 
TBQ 529308 0.33 1.20 -1.25 -0.26 0.00 0.47 6.25 
EP 571536 -0.01 0.06 -0.40 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 
Long-term ownership measures:      
L3 640784 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.25 0.99 
L5 640784 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.97 
LIOP 640784 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.14 1.00 
Long-term ownership measures:    
L3IND 638385 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.16 0.95 
L3GRY 638385 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.95 
L3QIX 638385 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.16 0.96 
L3DED 638385 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.93 
L3TRA 638385 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.96 
L3VAL 638385 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.96 
L3GRO 638385 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.92 
L3GI 638385 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.98 
Control variables:       
LOGMV 640784 18.97 1.94 15.24 17.54 18.78 20.22 24.15 
DTA 640784 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.31 0.86 
AGE 640784 14.28 12.08 1.00 5.00 11.00 20.00 64.00 
TOV 640784 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.65 
CAPX 640784 0.01 0.03 -0.19 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.30 
Instrument variables:      
R1TR2 395045 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
R2TR1 395045 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
R2TN 395045 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
NTR2 395045 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3 Baseline regression, long-term ownership and firm performance 
Table 3 reports the panel regression coefficients of the baseline regression. The 
dependent variables are ROA, Tobin’s Q and EY, measured as the average from 
quarter t+1 to t+4. The sample period is 1982–2013. All the independent 
variables are measured at time t. The missing data in the independent variables are 
filled with 0. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. The industry (2-digit SIC number) and quarter fixed effects are 
in all the regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Detailed 
definitions of variables are in Appendix A. 
  (3) (4) (5) 
 
ROAi, t+1,,t+4 TBQi,t+1,,t+4 EYi,t+1,,t+4 
L3i,t 0.009*** 0.079*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA i,t 0.599*** 
  
 
(0.00) 
  TBQ i,t 
 
0.798*** 
 
  
(0.00) 
 EY i,t 
  
0.403*** 
   
(0.00) 
LOGMV i,t 0.002*** 0.003** 0.004*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
DTA i,t -0.000 -0.062*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.33) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t 0.000*** -0.002*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOV i,t -0.018*** -0.319*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t 0.018*** -0.128*** 0.018*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.040*** 0.281*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Industry FE Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y 
Observations 549,400 507,429 550,107 
R-squared 0.522 0.749 0.279 
Robust p-value in parentheses. 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 1 Long-term ownership and firm performance in  the longer future 
Figure 1 shows the coefficients of L3 in the regressions of future firm performance on the long-
term ownership and control variables which include LOGMV, DTA, AGE, TOV, CAPX, industry 
(2-digit SIC) and time fixed effect( quarter).  Firm performance is measured at quarter t+4, t+8, 
t+12, t+16 and t+20 as shown in the horizontal axis. The coefficients of long-term ownership (L3) 
are labeled on the vertical axis. The three parts of the figure show ROA, Tobin’s Q and EY from 
top to bottom. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level and the red dashed line shows the 
confidence interval of estimates at the 95% level.   Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 4 2SLS estimation, long-term ownership and firm performance 
Table  4 reports the 2SLS estimation results of firm performance on long-term ownership. The sample period 
is 1995–2013 when the instrumental variable is available. Columns (1)–(3) show the result of our first step 
estimation. The fitted values of L3(IVL3) is then used as substitutes in the second stage regressions (columns 
(4)–(6)). All the independent variables are measured at time t. The missing data in the  independent variables 
are filled with 0. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Industry 
(2-digit SIC number) and quarter fixed effects are in all the regressions. The standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. Detailed definitions of variables are in  Appendix A.  
 First Stage Second Stage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES L3 L3 L3 ROAi,t+1,,t+4 TBQi,,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,,t+4 
IVL3 i,t 
 
  0.019*** 1.127*** 0.011** 
  
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) 
R1TR2 i,t 0.119*** 0.103*** 0.117***    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
R2TR1 i,t -0.004 0.010 -0.001    
 (0.45) (0.11) (0.85)    
R2TN i,t -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.010***    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
NTR2 i,t -0.097*** -0.090*** -0.097***    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
ROA i,t 0.108***   0.616*** 
  
 
(0.00)   (0.00) 
  TBQ i,t 
 
-0.018***  
 
0.807*** 
 
  
(0.00)  
 
(0.00) 
 EP i,t 
 
 -0.033*** 
  
0.400*** 
  
 (0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
LOGMV i,t 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.001*** -0.054*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DTA i,t 0.028*** 0.014** 0.025*** 0.001 -0.067*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000*** -0.006*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOV i,t 0.045*** 0.061*** 0.039*** -0.017*** -0.377*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t -0.118*** -0.084*** -0.114*** 0.021*** -0.047 0.018*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) 
Constant i,t -0.963*** -1.015*** -0.984*** -0.069*** 1.937*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  
  
   Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 360,431 337,295 364,650 344,618 321,106 348,949 
R-squared 0.542 0.558 0.542 0.552 0.731 0.283 
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Table 5 Type of long-term investors and firm performance 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the 2SLS estimation results of the future ROA on different types of long-term 
ownership. The sample period is 1995–2013 when the instrumental variable is available. Columns (1)–(8) represent 
the regressions of ROA on the long-term ownership of independent investors, grey investors, quasi-indexers, 
dedicated institutional investors, transient investors value investors and growth investors, respectively. The 
instrument variables are R1TR2, R2TR1, R2TN and NTR2. The first stage estimation is not displayed for 
simplicity. The fitted values of long-term ownerships are used as substitutes in the second stage regressions 
(denoted with a leading”). All the independent variables are measured at time t. The missing data in independent 
variables are filled with 0. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Industry (2-digit SIC number) and quarter fixed effects are in all the regressions. The standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level. Detailed definitions of variables are in  Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 
IVL3IND i,t 0.027***        
 (0.00)        
IVL3GRY i,t  0.060***       
  (0.00)       
IVL3QIX i,t   0.025***      
   (0.00)      
IVL3DED i,t    0.146***     
    (0.00)     
IVL3TRA i,t     0.125***    
     (0.00)    
IVL3VAL i,t      0.061***   
      (0.00)   
IVL3GRO i,t       0.096***  
       (0.00)  
IVL3GI i,t        0.036*** 
        (0.00) 
ROA i,t 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOGMV i,t 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 
 
(0.09) (0.20) (0.06) (0.58) (0.27) (0.12) (0.05) (0.13) 
DTA i,t 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOV i,t 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t -0.072*** -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.067*** -0.073*** -0.067*** -0.068*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         Observations 344,618 344,618 344,618 344,618 344,618 344,618 344,618 344,618 
R-squared 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.551 0.552 0.552 
Method Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel 
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Panel B of Table 5 reports the 2SLS estimation results of future Tobin’s Q on different types of long-term 
ownership. The sample period is 1995–2013 when the instrumental variable is available. Columns (1)–(8) represent 
the regressions of Tobin’s Q on the long-term ownership of independent investors, grey investors, quasi-indexers, 
dedicated institutional investors, transient investors value investors and growth investors, respectively. The 
instrument variables are R1TR2, R2TR1, R2TN and NTR2. The first stage estimation is not displayed for simplicity. 
The fitted values of long-term ownership are used as substitutes in the second stage regressions (denoted with a 
leading”). All the independent variables are measured at time t. The missing data in the independent variables are 
filled with 0. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Industry (2-digit 
SIC number) and quarter fixed effects are in all the regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 
IVL3IND i,t 1.724*** 
        (0.00) 
       IVL3GRY i,t 
 
3.129*** 
       
 
(0.00) 
      IVL3QIX i,t 
  
1.463*** 
      
  
(0.00) 
     IVL3DED i,t 
   
9.857*** 
     
   
(0.00) 
    IVL3TRA i,t 
    
7.139*** 
    
    
(0.00) 
   IVL3VAL i,t 
     
4.366*** 
   
     
(0.00) 
  IVL3GRO i,t 
      
4.789*** 
  
      
(0.00) 
 IVL3GI i,t 
       
2.068*** 
 
       
(0.00) 
TBQ i,t 0.807*** 0.804*** 0.807*** 0.812*** 0.797*** 0.829*** 0.787*** 0.803*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOGMV i,t -0.049*** -0.061*** -0.051*** -0.060*** -0.052*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.058*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DTA i,t -0.063*** -0.072*** -0.055*** -0.107*** -0.088*** -0.064*** -0.059*** -0.067*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.002*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOV i,t -0.356*** -0.415*** -0.414*** 0.015 -0.461*** -0.346*** -0.302*** -0.420*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t -0.056 -0.041 -0.063 -0.003 -0.025 -0.023 -0.046 -0.071 
 
(0.28) (0.43) (0.23) (0.95) (0.63) (0.67) (0.38) (0.17) 
Constant 1.805*** 2.054*** 1.872*** 1.807*** 1.925*** 1.841*** 1.766*** 1.944*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         Observations 321,106 321,106 321,106 321,106 321,106 321,106 321,106 321,106 
R-squared 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.731 
Method Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel 
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Panel C of Table 5 reports the 2SLS estimations results of the future Earning Yield on different types of long-term 
ownership. The sample period is 1995–2013 when the instrumental variable is available. Columns (1)–(8) represent 
the regressions of Earning Yield on the long-term ownership of independent investors, grey investors, quasi-indexers, 
dedicated institutional investors, transient investors value investors and growth investors, respectively The 
instrument variables are R1TR2, R2TR1, R2TN and NTR2. The first stage estimation is not displayed for simplicity. 
The fitted values of long-term ownerships are used as substitutes in the second stage regressions (denoted with a 
leading”). All the independent variables are measured at time t. The missing data in he independent variables are 
filled with 0. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Industry (2-digit  
SIC number) and quarter fixed effects are in all the regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix A. 
 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
EYi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 EYi,,t+1,t+4 EYi,,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t,,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 
IVL3IND i,t 0.012        
 (0.12)        
IVL3GRY i,t  0.049***       
  (0.00)       
IVL3QIX i,t   0.017**      
   (0.02)      
IVL3DED i,t    -0.034     
    (0.48)     
IVL3TRA i,t     0.069**    
     (0.04)    
IVL3VAL i,t      0.035*   
      (0.08)   
IVL3GRO i,t       0.057**  
       (0.02)  
IVL3GI i,t        0.021** 
        (0.03) 
EY i,t 0.399*** 0.401*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.400*** 0.400*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOGMV i,t 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DTA i,t -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOV i,t -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.111*** -0.098*** -0.105*** -0.121*** -0.107*** -0.110*** -0.106*** -0.106*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         Observations 348,949 348,949 348,949 348,949 348,949 348,949 348,949 348,949 
R-squared 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 0.283 
Method Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
40 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 2SLS, Alternative measures of long-term ownership 
Table 6 reports the 2SLS estimation results of firm performance on the alternative measures of long-term 
ownership. The sample period is 1995–2013 when the instrumental variable is available. The first stage 
estimation is not displayed for simplicity. The fitted values of LIOP(IVLIOP) and L5(IVL5) are used as 
substitutes in the second stage regressions. All the independent variables are measured at time t. The missing 
data in the independent variables are filled with 0. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. Industry (2-digit SIC number) and quarter fixed effects are in all the regressions. The 
standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ROAi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 
IVLIOP i,t 0.055*** 3.463*** -0.028 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.37)    
IVL5 i,t 
   
0.031*** 1.499*** 0.023*** 
    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA i,t 0.627*** 
  
0.630*** 
  
 
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
  TBQ i,t 
 
0.776*** 
  
0.765*** 
 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
 EY i,t 
  
0.508*** 
  
0.509*** 
   
(0.00) 
  
(0.00) 
LOGMV i,t 0.001*** -0.061*** 0.005*** 0.001*** -0.047*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DTA i,t 0.001 -0.093*** -0.013*** 0.001* -0.084*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t 0.000** -0.007*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.009*** 0.000 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.30) 
TOV i,t -0.019*** -0.345*** -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.315*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t 0.019*** -0.030 0.013*** 0.020*** -0.006 0.016*** 
 
(0.00) (0.63) (0.00) (0.00) (0.91) (0.00) 
Constant -0.034*** 1.454*** -0.094*** -0.028*** 1.451*** -0.069*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 344,618 321,106 348,949 344,618 321,106 348,949 
R-squared 0.551 0.731 0.283 0.552 0.731 0.283 
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Table 7 Short-term ownership and firm performance 
Table 7 reports the 2SLS estimations results of firm performance on short-term ownership. The sample period is 1995–2013 when the instrumental 
variable is available. The first stage estimation is not displayed for simplicity. The fitted values of S1(IVS1) and SIOP(IVSIOP) are used as 
substitutes in the second stage regressions. All the independent variables are measured at time t. The missing data in the independent variables are 
filled with 0. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Industry (2 digit SIC number) and quarter fixed 
effects are in all the regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Detailed definitions of variables are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 ROAi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t,,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 TBQi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 EYi,t+1,t+4 
IVS1 i,t -0.066***   -3.954***   -0.036*   
 
(0.00)   (0.00)   (0.06)   
IVS2 i,t  -0.029***   -1.717***   -0.019**  
 
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.03)  
IVSIOP i,t   -0.020**   -2.095***   -0.004 
 
  (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.77) 
ROA i,t 0.624*** 0.623*** 0.622***       
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
TBQ i,t    0.783*** 0.780*** 0.782***    
 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
EY i,t       0.401*** 0.400*** 0.399*** 
 
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LOGMV i,t 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.058*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DTA i,t 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.058*** -0.050*** -0.030** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOV i,t -0.005** -0.008*** -0.012*** 0.361*** 0.152*** 0.150*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.033*** 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** -0.112** -0.115** -0.164*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.084*** -0.089*** -0.094*** 0.820 0.558 -0.046 -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.119*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.31) (0.94) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
          Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 344,618 344,618 344,618 321,106 321,106 321,106 348,949 348,949 348,949 
R-squared 0.552 0.552 0.551 0.731 0.731 0.731 0.283 0.283 0.283 
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Appendix A 
Variables: Definition: Source: 
Dependent Variables:  
ROAi,t+1,t+4 Average quarterly ROA from t to t+4 quarter. ROA is defined as net income (NIQ)/total 
asset(ATQ).   
COMPUSTAT 
TBQi,t+1,t+4 Average Tobin’s Q from t to t+4 quarter. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of equity 
(CSHOQ*PRCCQ) +book value of debt (DLTTQ+DLCQ)) standardized by total assets (ATQ). 
COMPUSTAT 
EYi,t+1,t+4 Average earnings per share (EPSFXQ) from t to t+4 quarter standardized by stock price at time t. COMPUSTAT 
 Industry adjustment is applied to all dependent variables. We deduct the quarterly median value of industry (2 digit SIC code) 
performance from the firm performance variables to make such an adjustment. 
Ownership Variables:  
L3 Ownership of investors who hold shares of the firm for more than three years, aggregated at the firm 
level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within one year, the holding period is carried 
forward from the previous holding. 
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership 
L5 Ownership of investors who hold shares of the firm for more than five years, aggregated at the firm 
level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within one year, the holding period is carried 
forward from the previous holding. 
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership 
LIOP Ownership of investors who are classified as long-term investors based on Yan and Zhang (2009), 
aggregated at the firm level. The classification is based on the “churn ratio” while each quarter 
investors whose churn ratio is in the lowest 1/3 (slow turnover) long-term investors. See Yan and 
Zhang (2009) for details.  
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership 
S1 Ownership of investors whose entire holding period from enter to exit is less than one year and do 
not return within the next one year, aggregated at the firm level. 
 
S2 Ownership of investors whose entire holding period from enter to exit is less than two years and do 
not return within the next one year, aggregated at the firm level. 
 
SIOP Ownership of investors who are classified as long-term investors based on Yan and Zhang (2009), 
aggregated at the firm level. The classification is based on the “churn ratio” where each quarter 
investors whose churn ratio is in the highest 1/3 (faster turnover) are classified short-term investors. 
See Yan and Zhang (2009) for details.  
 
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership 
 Classification by Bushee and Goodman (2007)  
GROL3 Percentage shares of the firm held by “growth investors” who hold the stocks for more than three 
years. aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within one year, 
the holding period is carried forward from the previous holding. Growth investors are defined as 
those who prefer higher price to book ratio, higher price to earning ratio and lower dividend yield.  
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership and Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
Continue on next page: 
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VALL3 Percentage shares of the firm held by “value investors” who hold the stocks for more than three years. 
aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within one year, the 
holding period is carried forward from the previous holding. Value investors are defined as those who 
prefer lower price to book ratio, lower price to earning ratio and higher dividend yield.  
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership & Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
GIL3 Percentage shares of the firm held by “growth/income investors” who hold the stocks for more than 
three years. aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within 
one year, the holding period is carried forward from the previous holding. Investors who follow 
neither growth or value style are classified as growth/income investors.  
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership & Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
DEDL3 Percentage shares of the firm held by “dedicate investors” who hold the stocks for more than three 
years. aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within one year, 
the holding period is carried forward from the previous holding Dedicate investors are defined as 
investors with low turnover and concentrated portfolios.  
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership & Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
QIXL3 Percentage shares of the firm held by “quasi-indexers” who hold the stocks for more than three years. 
aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within one year, the 
holding period is carried forward from the previous holding. Quasi-indexers are defined as investors 
with low portfolio turnover and diversified portfolio.  
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership & Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
TRAL3 Percentage shares of the firm held by “growth/income investors” who hold the stocks for more than 
three years. aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within 
one year, the holding period is carried forward from the previous holding. Transient investors are 
those who have high portfolio turnover and highly diversified portfolio. 
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership & Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
INDL3  
 
Percentage shares of the firm held by “independent investors” who hold the stocks for more than 
three years, aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within 
one year, the holding period is carried forward from the previous holding. Independent investors are 
those who have less business relationship with the underlying firm, including independent investment 
advisors, investment companies and public pension funds. 
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership & Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
GRYL3 Percentage shares of the firm held by “grey investors” who hold the stocks for more than three years. 
aggregated at the firm level. If an investor sold out all the holdings but returned within one year, the 
holding period is carried forward from the previous holding. Grey investors are those who have more 
business relationship with the underlying firm, including banks, insurance companies, corporate 
pension funds, public pension funds university and foundation endowments and other investors. 
All Bushee’s classifications are from Bushee’s website: 
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.  
 
Thomson Financial Institutional 
Ownership & Bushee and 
Goodman (2007) 
Continue on next page: 
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Control Variables:  
LOGMV Log of firm market capitalization. Market capitalization calculated as price (PRC)*total shares 
outstanding (SHROUT). 
CRSP 
DTA Book leverage, calculated as total debt (DLTTQ+DLCQ) to total assets (ATQ).  COMPUSTAT 
AGE Number of years since the stock first emerged in the CRSP database. CRSP 
TOV Quarterly turnover, calculated as quarterly trading volume (VOL) divided by shares outstanding 
(SHROUT). 
CRSP 
CAPX Capital expenditure ratio. CAPX is defined as CAPX/ATQ.  COMPUSTAT 
Instrument Variables:  
R1TR2 Dummy variable. Takes the value of one at the quarterly following a firm switch from Russell 1000 to 
Russell 2000 index. Zero otherwise. 
Bloomberg 
R2TR1 Dummy variable. Takes the value of one at the quarterly following a firm switch from Russell 2000 to 
Russell 1000 index. Zero otherwise. 
Bloomberg 
R1TR2 Dummy variable. Takes the value of one at the quarterly following a firm dropping out from Russell 
2000 due to a decrease in market value. Zero otherwise. 
Bloomberg 
R1TR2 Dummy variable. Takes the value of one at the quarterly following a firm inclusion first time in 
Russell 2000 due to a market value increase. Zero otherwise. 
Bloomberg 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 Baseline regression using unadjusted performance variable 
Table B1 reports the panel regression coefficients of the baseline regression with 
performance measures that have not been adjusted by industry. The dependent 
variables are ROA, Tobin’s Q and EY, measured as the average from quarter t+1 
to t+4. The sample period is 1982–2013. All the independent variables are 
measured at time t. The missing data in the independent variables are filled with 0. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Industry (2-digit SIC number) and quarter fixed effects are in all the 
regressions. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Detailed 
definitions of variables are in Appendix A. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
ROAi, t+1,,t+4 TBQi,t+1,,t+4 EYi,t+1,,t+4 
L3i,t 0.010*** 0.039*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ROA i,t 0.613***   
 
(0.00)   
TBQ i,t  0.757***  
 
 (0.00)  
EY i,t   0.500*** 
 
  (0.00) 
LOGMV i,t 0.002*** 0.011*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DTA i,t -0.000 -0.100*** -0.015*** 
 
(0.31) (0.00) (0.00) 
AGE i,t 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
TOV i,t -0.020*** -0.245*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX i,t 0.017*** -0.096** 0.016*** 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Constant -0.040*** 0.267*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Industry FE Y Y Y 
Time FE Y Y Y 
Observations 549,400 507,429 550,107 
R-squared 0.569 0.772 0.373 
Robust p-value in parentheses. 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table B2 2L3 rank change over the long term 
Table B2 reports the likelihood of the long-term holding ranking in t+5 years. All firms are ranked into five different 
portfolio according to the long-term holdings of institutional investors (L3) at time t. Portfolio 1 represents firms 
with the least long-term holdings while P5 represents firms with the most long-term holdings. Then for each current 
portfolio, the probability that the firm ends up in a portfolio with a different rank in t+5 years is displayed in the 
table.  
  
Five-year-later rank 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Current 
rank 
1 58.0% 28.3% 10.3% 2.4% 1.1% 
2 41.0% 28.3% 23.6% 5.9% 1.2% 
3 33.5% 12.8% 30.9% 19.0% 3.8% 
4 24.2% 4.5% 19.2% 33.6% 18.5% 
5 15.8% 1.1% 5.8% 19.7% 57.6% 
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Table B3 Long-term holding and performance persistence 
Table B3 reports the double sort result of firm performance. In each panel, all the firms are sorted into 25 different 
portfolios by current long-term holdings and current performance. The average future performance from quarter 
t+1 to t+4 are shown in the table. The performance measures are ROA, Tobin’s Q and EY, respectively. The 
sample period is m 1982–2013. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
    
ROA Rank 
Rank    
  
1 2 3 4 5 (5-1) 
L3 Rank 
1 -0.038 -0.047 -0.035 -0.022 -0.011 0.027*** 
2 -0.009 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 0.005*** 
3 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
4 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.006* 
5 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009 0.014 0.013*** 
 
(5-1) 0.04*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 
 
        
    
TBQ Rank 
   
 
TBQ 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1) 
L3 Rank 
1 -0.202 -0.242 -0.251 -0.340 -0.424 -0.222*** 
2 -0.039 -0.022 -0.071 -0.082 -0.107 -0.068*** 
3 0.035 0.055 0.039 0.025 0.022 -0.014*** 
4 0.255 0.327 0.251 0.257 0.317 0.062*** 
5 0.889 1.094 0.993 0.987 1.078 0.189*** 
(5-1) 1.091*** 1.336*** 1.245*** 1.327*** 1.502*** 
 
        
    
EP Rank 
   
 
EP 1 2 3 4 5 (5-1) 
L3 Rank 
1 -0.034 -0.037 -0.030 -0.026 -0.022 0.012*** 
2 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016 -0.013 -0.008 0.01*** 
3 -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 0.008* 
4 -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.01*** 
5 -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 0.011*** 
(5-1) 0.026*** 0.031** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
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Highlights: 
 
 This paper investigates whether institutional investors that hold shares in a firm for a 
relatively long time affect firm performance, measured by Return on Assets (ROA), 
Tobin’s Q and Earnings Yield 
 We find that long-term ownership of institutional investors has a positive, long-lasting 
effect on firm performance. 
 We further find that the incentive for monitoring firm performance associated with long-
term holding is more important than some conventional classifications of investors in 
improving firm value. 
 We also find that a positive link between institutional owners and firm performance does 
not exist when investors only hold the stock for a short term. 
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